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Abstract
This paper makes three main points. Fiscal policy, …rst, may be needed
in the long run to maintain full employment and avoid secular stagnation.
If …scal policy is used in this way, second, the long-run debt ratio depends
(i) inversely on the rate of growth, (ii) inversely on government consumption, and (iii) directly on the degree of inequality. The analysis, third,
suggests that policies and policy debates have been misguided. The recent rediscovery of ’secular stagnation’ by Summers and others should be
welcomed, but the suggested theoretical redirection is unclear and does
not go far enough.
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Introduction

This paper makes three main points. Fiscal policy, …rst, may be needed in the
long run to maintain full employment and avoid secular stagnation. If …scal
policy is used in this way, second, the long-run debt ratio depends (i) inversely
on the rate of growth, (ii) inversely on government consumption, and (iii) directly on the degree of inequality. The analysis, third, suggests that policies and
policy debates have been misguided. The recent rediscovery of ’secular stagnation’ by Summers and others should be welcomed, but the suggested theoretical
redirection is unclear and does not go far enough.
Throughout the paper, the analysis will be con…ned to closed economies,
and it will be assumed that public debt is denominated in a currency that is
controlled by the central bank. In economies of this kind the government can
Paper presented at the 19th FMM Conference, "The Spectre of Stagnation – Europe in
the World Economy", Berlin 22 October 2015. The paper draws on material from Ryoo and
Skott (2013, 2015), Skott and Ryoo (2014, 2015) and Skott (2016).
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never be forced to default on its debt obligations. The situation is fundamentally di¤erent for an open economy with debt denominated in foreign currency.
The importance of this simple distinction, surprisingly, does not seem to be universally recognized. Collard et al. (2015), for instance, calculate ’sustainable’
public debt ratios using the same criteria for the US and Greece; Reinhart and
Rogo¤ (2010) make no distinctions among countries based on the denomination
of the public debt; the popular press has been full of references to Greece as a
cautionary tale for what could happen to the US if public debt is not reined in.
The closed economy assumption means that the analysis is not directly applicable to a country like Greece. But indirectly the analysis is highly relevant.
Policy analysis should not focus narrowly on the options for Greece, taking as
given the international environment in which it operates. An analysis of this
kind might show austerity in some form to be the only viable option. The same
conclusion might follow from the analysis of, say, Portugal or Ireland, each seen
in isolation and taking their international environment as given. But austerity policies cannot be justi…ed in this way for the Eurozone as a whole. Small
open economy models are intrinsically ’partial’ and subject to the same fallacy
of composition problems as other partial models, including the quintessential
Keynesian examples.1 The Eurozone controls its own currency and, less importantly, most of the international trade of the Eurozone countries is with other
countries within the zone. Models of a closed economy with debt in its own
currency can provide essential tools for an analysis of what could and should be
done in the Eurozone as a whole.
The analysis is subject to a second domain assumption. The focus is on
’mature economies’. Post-Keynesian models often consider a dual economy with
a perfectly elastic supply of labor. These models may be relevant for economies
with large amounts of (open or hidden) un- and underemployment in which the
growth rate can be determined without any reference to the labor market. In
a mature economy, by contrast, the labor supply is not perfectly elastic. For
simplicity I shall take the full-employment growth rate as exogenously given, but
the analysis could be extended to allow endogeneity in the growth rate.2 For
present purposes the important distinction between dual and mature economies
is the existence in the latter of a well-de…ned target value for the full-employment
growth rate. This mature-economy assumption, in my view, provides a better
starting point for the analysis of advanced economies like the US, Japan or most
of Europe than the alternative dual economy assumption.
Section 2 presents some simple algebra. The algebra leaves a degree of freedom, and theory is needed to close the model. Section 3 discusses a mainstream
closure, and section 4 turns to a Keynesian, functional-…nance perspective. Section 5 outlines some implications of functional …nance. Section 6 discusses
1 An

individual worker may be able to …nd work by accepting a low wage just as an individual household may raise its saving by reducing consumption. But this does not imply that
reductions in the money wages for all workers will also raise aggregate employment or that a
reduction is aggregate consumption raises aggregate saving.
2 The natural growth rate – the growth in the labor supply in e¢ciency units – could depend
on the employment rate (e.g. Flaschel and Skott 2006)
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secular stagnation. I brie‡y consider the Japanese case – which has …gured
prominently in these discussions – before commenting on the recent rediscovery
by Summers and others of secular stagnation. Section 7 concludes.

2

Some simple algebra

The nature of the long-run demand issue can be highlighted by a few, wellknown equations. The …rst equation is the equilibrium condition for the goods
market in a closed economy,
C
I
G
Y
=
+
+
K
K
K
K

(1)

The familiar Y = C + I + G equation has been divided through by the capital
stock; this is just a convenient normalization when dealing with long-run growth.
The ratio of government consumption to the capital stock is taken to be
exogenous,
G
=
(2)
K
The value of the government consumption ratio is contentious. How much should
we spend on public education or public health care, for instance? For present
purposes, however, debates on the appropriate size of the public sector are
largely irrelevant. The main questions that I want to explore relate to the principle of functional …nance, and these questions can be addressed independently
of the precise level of the government consumption ratio.3
The third equation represents straightforward accounting. In order to maintain full-employment growth and a constant output capital ratio, the ratio of
gross investment to the capital stock must be equal to the sum of the growth
rate of the labor supply (n) and the rate of depreciation ( ) :
I
=n+
K

(3)

By de…nition the output capital ratio is constant in steady growth, but the
steady-growth value may be endogenous. Mainstream theory typically assumes
a smooth production function with substitutability between capital and labor.
This assumption may be heroic, but it is also restrictive to ignore the choice
of technique. Hence, I shall allow for a dependence of the output capital ratio
( ) on the cost of …nance and, for simplicity, the cost of …nance is taken to be
3 There

is undoubtedly a positive correlation between support for public consumption and
support for an active …scal policy along the lines of functional …nance, but that is a di¤erent
issue.
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determined by the real rate of interest.4 Formally,
=

Y
= f (r)
K

(4)

Equation (4) re‡ects two assumptions: the possible in‡uence of the interest rate
on the choice of technique and, second, the assumption that the utilization of
capital is at the desired rate in steady growth.5
Combining equations (1)-(4), the condition for steady growth with full employment can be written as
C
=
K

C
= f (r)
K

+n+

(5)

The variables on the right-hand side of (5) are exogenous, and any adjustment
has to come through either the output capital ratio (the real rate of interest) or
the consumption-capital ratio. The question is, will these adjustments happen
automatically or is there a need for active policy? If the adjustment occurs
automatically via changes in interest rates and the output capital ratio, one can
ask whether these changes lead to a capital intensity that is ’socially optimal’
in some sense. If the adjustment does not come via the choice of technique,
the consumption ratio must do the adjusting, and we need to examine the
determination of this ratio. In particular, is policy intervention needed to a¤ect
the consumption ratio and if so, what kind of policy should be used?
Before proceeding, it may be useful to consider some possible Kaleckian and
Sra¢an objections to the way I am posing the questions. Kaleckians may take
issue with the treatment of the utilization rate of capital; Sra¢ans may question
the treatment of the choice of technique.
Post-Keynesian models typically take the production function to be of the
Leontief type: there is no choice of technique. This assumption does not necessarily mean that there is no endogeneity in the output capital ratio in these
models. In fact, Kaleckian models require accommodating variations in the
utilization rate of capital, not just in the short run (which is uncontroversial)
but also across di¤erent steady growth paths. The large long-run variations
envisaged by these models are at odds with the evidence and also, I believe,
hard to defend behaviorally.6 The analysis in this paper therefore assumes that
the utilization rate will be equal to the desired rate in steady growth. This
assumption is in line with both classical and Harrodian approaches to economic
4 There are two factor prices: the cost of …nance and the wage. The cost of …nance is taken
to be fullly determined by the interest rate; the real wage is determined by the markup and
the productivity of labor. Combining the …rst order condition from the choice of technique
with a markup-determined real wage, the choice of technique can be expressed as a function
of r: See Skott (1989, chapter 5) or Skott and Ryoo (2015) for details.
5 The speci…cation allows for a possible dependence of the desired utilization rate on the
interest rate (Skott 1989, Ryoo and Skott 2015).
6 The objections are spelled out in greater detail in Skott (2012) and Skott and Zipperer
(2012); a Kaleckian position is presented, inter alia, by Lavoie (1995), Dutt (1997), Dallery
and van Treeck (2011), and Hein et al. (2012).
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growth.7
Objections to my treatment of the choice of technique may point to the capital controversy. The controversy highlighted the di¢culties of constructing an
aggregate production function and demonstrated, in particular, how reswitching
and capital reversals may undermine economic theories that rely on movements
along a smooth production function. But these insights from the capital controversy do not imply that only one technique is available; nor do they invalidate
the in‡uence of the cost of …nance on the choice of technique.
The key question is not the existence of a choice of technique; it is whether
the output capital ratio will adjust automatically to ensure continuous full employment. It is this automatic adjustment in Solow-type models that is questionable.8 It is questionable for several reasons. The scope for capital-labor
substitution is limited in the short run; neighboring techniques in terms of capital intensity may di¤er widely in terms of the speci…c, disaggregated capital
goods that they use; a fall in the cost of …nance may lead to a ’perverse’ reduction in the aggregate capital intensity (the famous case of capital reversing).
But perhaps most importantly, when …rms choose the capital intensity of the
productive capacity generated by new investment, the choice is guided by relative input prices. If these relative input prices fail to clear the labor market,
the choice of technique will be determined by the wrong prices.9
Returning to the choice of technique as described by equation (4), a mainstream story with smooth and well-behaved substitution has f 0 > 0; the capital
controversy raised questions about the smoothness of the f -function and showed
that even if the f -function is di¤erentiable, we may have f 0 < 0; a Leontief
production function without any choice of technique corresponds to the special
case with f 0
0: The di¤erences between the three cases can be critical for
the adjustment process towards a steady growth path. As a characterization of
steady growth paths, however, the general expression in (4) is consistent with
all three cases.
7 Harrodian instability issues will not be considered in this paper. The paper examines
policy requirements for sustaining aggregate demand at the full-employment trajectory, assuming that the capital stock grows at the natural rate. Franke (2015) and Ryoo and Skott
(2015) analyze economic policy in economies with Harrodian instability.
8 In Joan Robinson’s words,

"The long wrangle about ’measuring capital’ has been a great deal of fuss over
a secondary question. The real source of trouble is the confusion between comparisons of equilibrium positions and the history of a process of accumulation."
(Robinson,1974, p. 9)
9 The lack of stability of full employment, not a rejection of the existence of a full employment equililbrium, was the key message of Keynes’s analysis in the General Theory; the
lack of stability in turn was associated with a lack of automatic adjustments in factor prices
(chapter 19).
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Mainstream answers

The determination of the output capital ratio and the consumption ratio di¤ers
across theories. Mainstream macroeconomics suggests that aggregate demand
will adjust automatically and that the equilibrium condition (5) will be met
in the long run. The traditional Solow model relies exclusively on variations
in the output capital ratio to ensure that the condition (5) will be satis…ed.
DSGE models with Ramsey optimization introduce an additional adjustment
mechanism.
In a Ramsey setting the growth in per capita consumption satis…es the Euler
condition
1
c^ = (r
)
(6)
where is the representative household’s discount rate and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution; r is the real rate of interest and c per capita consumption; a hat over a variable denotes a rate of growth (^
x = x=x
_
= (dx=dt)=x):
The growth rate of per capita consumption is constant in steady growth, and
equation (6) implies the existence of a well-de…ned ’natural rate of interest’:
r=

+

(7)

where is the rate of labor saving technical change. Given this unique ‘natural
rate of interest’, equation (4) determines the capital intensity. Using the representative household’s utility function as the welfare criterion, moreover, the
Ramsey model implies that the growth path – including the capital intensity –
will be optimal in the absence of externalities or other market imperfections.10
Unlike in the Solow model with a …xed saving rate, there is no danger of ’dynamic inconsistency’; high saving rates will never take the capital intensity to
a level above the ’golden rule’. In fact variations in capital intensity are not
even needed to ensure full-employment growth: the saving rate is an endogenous variable, and if is exogenously given (the Leontief case), the saving rate
(and thus C=K) will do all of the adjustment in equation (5).
In short, DSGE models based on Ramsey optimization give a clear answer.
Short-run problems associated with nominal stickiness may call for an active
monetary policy, but market adjustments in real wages and interest rates in
combination with the endogeneity of the saving rate serve to maintain full employment in the medium and long run. There is no need for either countercyclical
or long-run …scal policy. This is fortunate since Ricardian equivalence makes
…scal policy ine¤ectual in this setting: farsighted households adjust their saving
in response to changes in taxes. The main concern of …scal policy becomes to
minimize tax distortions. If revenue cannot be raised exclusively through lumpsum taxes and the costs of distortion are convex, this objective translates into
tax-smoothing (Barro 1979).
1 0 Although widely praised as "correct" (Blanchard 2008, p. 9) or "natural" (Woodford 2003,
p. 12), there is nothing correct or natural about this approach. The use of the representative
agent’s utility function as the social welfare function implies a systematic and intrinsic bias
in favor of the rich (Skott and Davis 2013).
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The DSGE/Ramsey results have dominated mainstream thinking. They are
not robust, however. Relax the model by introducing …nite lives, as in OLG
models without intergenerational altruism, and the optimality of the market
outcome disappears. Even with perfect optimization and continuous full employment, OLG models can produce dynamic ine¢ciency: the capital intensity
may be so high (and the return on capital so low) that all generations could be
made better o¤ by a reduction in saving. More generally, there is no presumption that market solutions will be socially optimal in these models.
The de…nition of social welfare raises a host of issues but consider a simple
case without any intra-generational inequality. Intergenerational distribution
then becomes the only distributional issue, and the social discount rate will be
central to the determination of a socially optimal trajectory. In the absence of
discounting the optimal trajectory maximizes consumption per capita in steady
growth (the golden-rule); if the social welfare function calls for discounting future consumption, the steady-growth value of the capital intensity will be below
the golden-rule level. Conditional on the normative choice of a discount rate, let
and r be the socially optimal capital intensity and the associated interest
rate. Except by a ‡uke, these values will be inconsistent with market clearing
in a neoclassical OLG model: the value of C=K (at = ; r = r ) will not
clear the goods market at full employment:
C
R
K

(n + )

(8)

The …nite horizons also bring a solution to the problem that they create:
the ine¤ectiveness of …scal policy disappears when households have …nite horizons, even if one retains all other assumptions of rational behavior and perfect
foresight. Future taxes will be paid by di¤erent taxpayers, and there is no
Ricardian equivalence in the OLG model. Changes in current taxes therefore
in‡uence current consumption, and …scal policy can be used to maintain full
employment and an optimal capital intensity. The ‡ip side of these results is
that …scal policy a¤ects the interest rate and the choice of technique. Putting
it di¤erently, unlike in models with Ramsey optimization, the natural rate of
interest’ – the interest rate associated with full employment – cannot be de…ned
independently of …scal policy.
There is nothing new and radical about these propositions. Diamond (1965)
derived many of them formally for a neoclassical OLG model; see also Skott and
Ryoo (2014, 2015).
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Functional …nance

OLG models have many failings from a Keynesian perspective, but very similar
conclusions can be reached using more traditional Keynesian models.
Twenty two years before the Diamond model, Lerner (1943) had discussed
the principle of ’functional …nance’. Fiscal policy, he argued, is an essential
instrument of Keynesian policy, and it should be used "with an eye only to the
7

results of these actions on the economy and not to any established traditional
doctrine about what is sound or unsound" (p. 39; italics in original). According
to functional …nance there is nothing virtuous about balancing the government
budget over any particular period. The public debt, likewise, is of no importance
in itself. Households may need to balance their budgets, but governments are
under no such compulsion, and doctrines of ’sound …nance’ are based on a false
analogy.
Lerner spells out the implications of functional …nance.11 Functional …nance,
he argues,
"prescribes, …rst, the adjustment of total spending (by everybody
in the economy, including the government) in order to eliminate
both unemployment and in‡ation ... ; second, the adjustment of
public holdings of money and of government bonds, by government
borrowing or debt repayment, in order to achieve the rate of interest
which results in the most desirable level of investment; and, third,
the printing, hoarding or destruction of money as needed for carrying
out the …rst two parts of the program." (Lerner 1943, p. 41)
The "most desirable level of investment" is typically taken as given in the short
run, and the extension of Lerner’s argument to the analysis of long-run growth
may need comment.
The change in the capital stock is given by the di¤erence between investment
and depreciation,
K_ = I
K
A trajectory of desirable levels of investment therefore de…nes a trajectory of
desirable capital stocks. If full employment is being maintained along this trajectory, we also have a trajectory for output. Thus, from a long-run perspective,
Lerner’s prescriptions for policies that produce full employment and desirable
levels of investment can be stated alternatively as prescriptions for policies that
produce a trajectory of full employment and desirable output capital ratios. The
output capital ratio in steady growth is determined by the choice of technique,
and we can now use the simple framework in the previous section: Lerner’s
investment argument translates into the requirement that the steady-growth
value of the interest rate satisfy the condition
1

r=f

(

)

This requirement pins down the steady-growth value of the real interest rate,
and policy makers must turn to …scal policy to adjust aggregate demand and
1 1 A large Keynesian literature takes positions that are similar to functional …nance (even if
not always directly inspired by Lerner); examples include Schlicht (2006), Godley and Lavoie
(2007), Arestis and Sawyer (2010), Davidson (2010), Palley 2010, and Nersisyan and Wray
(2010). .
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maintain full employment.12 13 We have taken government consumption as
exogenous, but taxes and transfers can be used to a¤ect consumption.14
Functional …nance holds that intrinsically government de…cits and public
debt are neither good nor bad. Even from a functional …nance perspective,
however, the level of debt is not irrelevant. High debt may not be morally
wrong, and there may be no risk that the government becomes unable to pay
back the debt, but the level of debt can have implications for the distribution
of income and for the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy; Taylor rules that are
stabilizing for low debt ratios can become destabilizing if the debt ratio exceeds
a certain threshold (Ryoo and Skott 2015). Added to this, the possibility that
public debt could become ’unsustainable’ has been a recurrent theme in policy
debates. Thus, it may be interesting to examine the implications of functional
…nances for the time path of public debt.
The change in public debt given by
B_ = rB + G

T

(9)

and under functional …nance, the policy makers adjust T to maintain full employment growth. The required adjustments in taxes depend on the precise
speci…cation of consumption. For present purposes, I shall simply assume that
consumption is a linear function of income and wealth, and that household
wealth is the sum of …xed capital and the stock of government bonds. Formally,
C = c(Y + rB

T ) + (K + B)

(10)

where T and B are taxes and government debt; the positive parameters c and
describe the propensity to consume out of current disposable income and wealth.
As shown in appendix A, equations (5), (10) and (9) produce a di¤erential
equation for the debt to capital ratio, b = B=K:
1
b_ = [(1
c

c)(

)

n

]

(n +

c

)b

The negative feedback from the level of the debt ratio to the change in the debt
ratio implies that the stationary solution is stable. The intuition is simple. An
increase in public debt raises both private disposable income (for given T ) and
private wealth. Both of these e¤ects stimulate consumption, and policy makers
need to raise taxes in order to prevent overheating and in‡ation.
1 2 In the Leontief case without a choice of technique, the interest rate has no e¤ect on the
right hand side of equation (8), and the interest rate can be set to satisfy some other objective
(to a¤ect the share of income going to rentiers, for instance). The underlying determinants of
and r is irrelevant for the subsequent analysis of the …scal policy requirements.
1 3 This determination of the steady-growth value of the interest rate does not preclude shortrun variations in the interest rate around its steady-growth value for stabilization purposes;
Franke (2015), Ryoo and Skott (2015).
1 4 The exogeneity of government consumption (and the taxes) is a reasonable assumption for
the long run. Variations in government consumption around the exogenous long-run trajectory
may be a better tool for short-run stabilization, however (Ryoo and Skott 2015).
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Stability implies that the debt ratio converges to the stationary solution,
b!b =

5

(1

c)(

)
nc +

n

(11)

Implications

Growth e¤ects It follows from equation (11) that the steady-growth value of
the debt ratio depends inversely on the natural growth rate n: This implication
of the model has direct relevance for the interpretation of observed correlations
between debt and growth.
Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010, p. 575) famously argued that debt to GDP
ratios above 90 percent “mean levels of growth almost 4 percent lower”. Their
evidence turned out to be based on spreadsheet errors and curious weighting
procedures (Herndon et al. 2014). The sharp threshold disappears when these
errors are corrected, but the data still appear to show a negative correlation
between growth and debt. The implications of this correlation are far from
obvious. The correlation could be entirely spurious, and if there are causal
links, the causation could go either way or both ways.
The evidence from short-run patterns suggests causality from growth to debt
(Ash et al. 2015). This result may not be surprising: tax revenues drop when
growth falters, leading to rising debt. The more interesting question concerns
the links between growth and debt in the long run, and a purely empirical
analysis is unlikely to shed much light on this long-run question. The model
in section 4 contributes a theoretical perspective. It shows that …scal policies
which maintain full employment produce a long-run causal link from low growth
rates to high debt ratios: low growth leads to high debt. Intuitively, a higher
growth rate implies that the share of investment in output must rise and that
consumption must be squeezed. This squeeze is achieved by raising taxes, and
higher taxes reduce the long-run debt ratio.
The growth rate was taken to be exogenous in section 4, and causality runs
unambiguously from growth to debt. The exogeneity assumption can be challenged, and causality could run both ways; the presence of a causal link from
growth to debt does not preclude a reverse link from debt to growth. Several
mechanisms have been suggested (see, e.g. the survey in Elmendorf and Mankiw
1999).
One set of arguments rely on crowding out and an increase in interest rates.
The evidence does not, however, show a clear positive relation between the
public debt ratio and interest rates. The US has seen large variations in the
debt ratio but the correlation with interest rates is, if anything, negative. This
lack of support for crowding out is con…rmed by more detailed studies. In the
words of Engen and Hubbard (2005, p.83), “some economists believe there is
a signi…cant, large, positive e¤ect of government debt on interest rates, others
interpret the evidence as suggesting that there is no e¤ect on interest rates”.
Distortionary taxation represents another possible source of negative causal
e¤ects from debt to economic growth. The broad evidence may not be kind
10

to this hypothesis; the US experienced its highest rates of sustained growth
during the high-tax years of the ’golden age’. But leaving aside doubts about
the magnitude and relevance of any such e¤ects, the argument faces another
problem: an increase in the debt ratio need not be associated with a rise in the
tax rate. Both the long-run debt ratio and the long-run tax rate are endogenous
variables but as shown in Appendix B, the correlation between tax rate and debt
can be negative. Shifts in the consumption parameters c and , for instance,
will produce opposite movements in the long run values of the debt ratio and
) < n: Thus, if tax rates have negative growth e¤ects,
the tax rates if r(1
high debt could be bene…cial.
Austerity In the short run, austerity leads to recession, and a fall in income
tends to raise the debt income ratio (Leao 2013). The analysis in section 4
shows that austerity policies may also be counterproductive on their own terms
in the long run (assuming that the aim is to reduce public debt and not just to
squeeze the public sector): the debt ratio in equation (11) depends inversely on
government consumption :
Schlicht (2006) derives this result for a model that is closely related to the
one in section 4, and the result is quite robust. Ryoo and Skott (2013) show that
it holds for a stock-‡ow consistent model of a corporate economy (an economy
in which household wealth takes the form of bonds and stocks rather than direct
ownership of …xed capital). Skott and Ryoo (2014, 2015) consider neoclassical
and Keynesian OLG models and show that austerity in the form of cuts to social
security generate a rising debt ratio. Hysteresis e¤ects in the labor market could
reinforce these results. Like the analysis in section 4, the above papers take the
employment trajectory associated with full employment to be independent of
short-run ‡uctuations in output. If austerity policies that cause a recession produce permanent (or very prolonged) negative e¤ects on the future employment
trajectory, the paradoxical long-run e¤ects of austerity on debt are magni…ed
(DeLong and Summers 2012).
Income distribution and saving The rich, on average, have a higher rate
of saving than the poor, and rising inequality tends to reduce the average rate of
consumption. A fall in consumption, however, must be o¤set by …scal expansion
to prevent unemployment. The model in section 4 did not include income distribution explicitly, but equation (11) can be used to …nd the derived e¤ects of
changes in household behavior on the debt ratio. Not surprisingly, the equation
shows that the debt ratio depends inversely on the consumption parameters c
and :
The distribution of income is important in its own right, and post-tax inequality can be a¤ected by the structure of taxation. Interestingly, the structure
of taxation also in‡uences the debt dynamics. The stability of the debt ratio
derives from two feedback e¤ects. An increase in debt raises consumption both
via the wealth e¤ect and because of the rise in interest payments associated
with an increase in debt. Functional …nance calls for an increase in taxes to
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neutralize this stimulus to aggregate demand. If, as in section 4, all households
have the same consumption rate out of disposable income, the result is a stable
income dynamics.
Distribution e¤ects in combination with di¤erential saving rates can weaken
the magnitude of the required tax increase following a rise in debt: a small tax
increase on workers with a low saving rate may be su¢cient to o¤set the demand
e¤ect from interest payments that go to high-saving rentiers. If this happens
the increase in debt can lead to a rise in the de…cit, and the debt dynamics can
become explosive. The remedy is straightforward: use taxes on capital income
as the …scal instrument, instead of taxes on wage income. The same reasoning
has another implication. Switching taxes towards capital income and the rich
will reduce the long run debt ratio in the stable case. Indeed, this conclusion
was anticipated by Lerner (1943, p. 49):
"if for any reason the government does not wish to see private property grow too much (whether in the form of government bonds or
otherwise) it can check this by taxing the rich ... The rich will not
reduce their spending signi…cantly ... By this means the debt can
be reduced to any desired level and kept there."
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Secular stagnation

Japan experienced 25 years of miracle growth in the post-war period. GDP per
capita grew at an astounding average annual rate of 8.2 percent between 1945
and 1970. The per capita growth rate dropped to 3.6 percent between 1970 and
1990, and the Japanese economy has stagnated since then. With average per
capita growth of only 0.8 percent between 1990 and 2014, Japan has become
the poster case for ’secular stagnation’, and policy makers appear powerless.
Interest rates have hit the zero lower bound, and public debt has climbed to
about 250 percent of GDP. Simple as it is, the analysis in sections 4-5 can help
make sense of this pattern of growth and stagnation.
The Japanese economy was characterized by large amounts of hidden unemployment and underemployment until the late 1960s. Throughout this period
the labor supply to the modern sector was highly elastic, and there was a large
potential for technological catchup. An elastic labor supply and a potential
for technological catchup do not ensure fast growth. In the absence of state
intervention – improvements in infrastructure and education along with successful industrial strategies – the economy could have followed a very di¤erent,
slow-growth trajectory. But the elastic labor supply was important by permitting fast growth, and fast growth (high accumulation rates) allowed the goods
market to be in equilibrium, despite high saving rates.
Labor constraints began to appear around 1970 as the economy approached
maturity. The growth rates of the previous period exceeded the ‘natural rate
of growth’, and a decline in the rate of growth was inevitable. But the growth
rate dropped below the natural rate. A combination of high saving rates and
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slow growth produced a structural liquidity trap: "the proximate problem of
the Japanese economy in the 1990s may be one of aggregate demand, but the
demand de…ciency is structural" (Nakatani and Skott 2007, p. 307).
With high saving rates, a low natural rate of growth and a reduced accumulation potential, Japan needed other sources of aggregate demand. The …nancial
and real estate bubble of the 1980s alleviated the demand problems for while,
but when the bubble burst, the public and foreign sectors would have had to
pick up the slack to maintain full employment. Political constraints excluded
large and sustained trade surpluses, and political constraints also restrained the
…scal route. The result was limping growth with persistent underperformance,
weak labor markets and de‡ationary tendencies.
Insu¢cient aggregate demand remains a problem. A more aggressive demand policy is called for, and public debt should be allowed to rise. This does
not imply that ever-increasing debt will be required. The structural problems
have been loosened somewhat, partly as a result of the rise in debt that has
been allowed to take place. The debt may not be as high as it should have
been, had the authorities followed a pure functional …nance approach, but …scal
de…cits and a large debt have boosted demand. Other factors have helped too.
Demographic changes and an aging population have contributed to a fall in the
saving rate; the household saving rate out of net disposable income has declined
steeply from around 20 percent in the mid 1970s to about 2 percent in after
2010.
This broad story of the Japanese economy explains both the rapid growth
and the subsequent stagnation within the same general framework. It does this
by drawing on both demand and supply side elements. The fundamental change
on the supply side was the transition from a dual to a mature economy; this
transition and the associated decline in the share of investment in output led to
structural demand side problems.
The supply side appears in most accounts of Japanese stagnation, but typically in a very di¤erent way. It is commonly argued that the Japanese economy
su¤ers from structural problems of various kinds and that fundamental reforms
are needed. The latest OECD Economic Survey follows this line. There is a
need for "bold structural reforms" to "improve the business climate" (by, inter
alia, "promoting labor market ‡exibility" and "revitalising venture capital investment"). Fiscal policy also needs to be addressed, and the "top …scal priority
is reducing government debt" (OECD 2015, p. 5). The bene…ts of these reforms
from a pure supply side perspective – assuming that there were no aggregate
demand problems – are not obvious, and some of the OECD recommendations
will have strong, adverse e¤ects on the demand side. Fiscal consolidation is the
obvious case in point but not the only one. Supply side reforms that increase
inequality will tend to raise the saving rate and reduce aggregate demand.15
The demand side has received attention, too. Demand side explanations
have focused on inadequate …scal and monetary policies in combination with
1 5 A disregard of aggregate demand can be found in many contributions. Rather then
re‡ecting policy responses to weak demand, the Japanese case, according to Obstfeld (2013,
p. 2) “illustrates how dangerous it can be to tolerate large public debt buildups”.
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the slowdown of investment following the bubble period in the late eighties
(Krugman 1998). As far as they go, these explanations are in line with the
argument in this paper. But until recently at least, aggregate demand problems
have been seen as largely transitory, not as re‡ections of a structural, long run
demand issue. This may be changing with the rediscovery of ’secular stagnation’
by Summers and others.
In his presentation at an IMF conference Summers (2013) raised the prospect
of secular stagnation, not just for Japan but as a relevant concern for other advanced economies, including the US.16 Summers’ theoretical analysis was somewhat tentative, but the presentation still caused a stir. Summers (2015a) elaborates on the argument, suggesting that because of “the zero bound on nominal
interest rates” there is "no guarantee that the real rate will be low enough for full
employment” (p. 61). Importantly, this state of a¤airs may not be short-lived
since “equilibrium interest rates may be lower on a sustained basis” (p. 62). He
concludes that "…nding ways to increase the demand to spend, no matter how
counterintuitive, is likely to be an important part of the way forward" (p.65).
Summers also accepts, however, that “…scal policy may not be possible, given
that the government cannot inde…nitely expand its debt” (Summers 2015b)
Krugman has been making similar points about the need for increased spending in his discussions of liquidity traps and the lessons from Japan (e.g. Krugman
2013a). Like Summers, he also sees high debt as a problem:
"Yes, the United States has a long-run budget problem. Dealing
with that problem is going to require, …rst of all, sharply bending the
curve on Medicare costs; without that, nothing works. And second,
it’s going to require some combination of spending cuts and revenue
increases, amounting to at least 3 percent of GDP and probably
more, on a permanent basis." (Krugman 2010)
The nature of the long-run debt problem is not explained and there appears
to be no recognition that public debt does not need to expand inde…nitely. The
Summers and Krugman analysis presents a strong contrast to Reinhart-Rogo¤
claims about dramatic, negative e¤ects of debt on growth. But the break is
incomplete.
Part of the problem may stem from the lack of a clear theoretical framework
in Summers’s analysis. The reference to ’equilibrium interest rates’ raises a
number of questions. The equilibrium interest rate may be well-de…ned in DSGE
models with Ramsey optimization. But secular stagnation …nds no place in these
models and …scal policy is ine¤ectual. Leaving the DSGE setting, …scal policy
and the size of the public debt in‡uence aggregate demand. But as argued in
sections 4-5, the output capital ratio that is required for steady growth with full
employment – and thereby the interest rate that is required – will be contingent
on the …scal parameters. Putting it di¤erently, assumptions must be made
1 6 The dangers of secular stagnation has been emphasized by many (post-) Keynesians before
Summers’ intervention. Examples include Godley (1999), Wray (2000), Skott (2001) and
Palley (2002).
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about …scal policy and the debt ratio in order for statements about ’equilibrium
interest rates’ to be meaningful.
Functional …nance faces a similar question but approaches it di¤erently: interest rates are chosen to achieve the desirable capital intensity (possibly taking
into account other criteria, including income distribution) and contingent on
this choice, …scal policy is adjusted to maintain full employment. The result is
an endogenously determined long-run debt ratio.
If there were strong reasons to prefer a particular debt ratio, one could start
with a target for the debt ratio and let interest rates and the capital intensity do
the adjusting. Assuming that the output capital ratio (the choice of technique)
depends strongly on interest rate, the equilibrium interest rate could be de…ned
as the rate that is consistent with full employment and the target debt ratio.17
This may be Summers’s implicit assumption. But if it is, the target debt ratio
needs to be speci…ed, and it is not obvious that this target should be independent
of other parameters that a¤ect aggregate demand. Consider, for instance, a fall
in the natural growth rate. An exogenously speci…ed target for the debt ratio
would imply that all the adjustment falls on the capital intensity. Assuming
a well-behaved production function, the capital intensity would need to rise,
even if this were to lead to dynamic ine¢ciency. Moreover, unlike functional
…nance, a reliance on adjustments in capital intensity to maintain growth with
full employment comes up against all the problems highlighted by the capital
controversy.

7

Conclusion

Austerity policies have had devastating consequences for unemployment, poverty
and political instability. Some of the most dramatic examples come from the
Eurozone, and the analysis in this paper does not apply directly to individual
countries in a currency union. But it does apply to the Eurozone as whole. The
obsession with public debt and sound …nance is tragic and unnecessary.
It is disturbing and deeply ironic that the main justi…cation for these policies
has come in large part from crude correlations between debt and growth. It is
disturbing because simple correlations leave open the question of causation.
It is ironic because the advocacy has come from a profession that has been
preaching the Lucas critique and the impossibility of informed policy analysis
based on mere statistical correlation.18 It is doubly ironic because the theoretical
orthodoxy that emerged in response to the Lucas critique implies that, as a …rst
approximation, public debt is a non-issue.
Another defense of sound …nance comes from calculations that show the
’unsustainability’ of large, permanent primary de…cits. These calculations are
1 7 The sensitivity of the choice of technique to changes in interest rates becomes important
if one takes this approach. By contrast, functional …nance operates equally well with Leontief
production function.
1 8 See Skott (2014) for a discussion of the Lucas critique (which prompted the move towards
these models) and the implications of the critique.
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largely silly. There is no point in asking whether this or that arbitrary path of
primary de…cits is sustainable. Arbitrary paths generally do not produce good
results. No Keynesian economist advocates policies of this kind. Fiscal and
monetary policies are instruments. They should be designed to maintain (nonin‡ationary) full employment and a desirable trajectory for investment (and
thereby the capital output ratio). Market forces do not automatically ensure
these outcomes and there is need for aggregate demand policy.
The rediscovery of secular stagnation shows a growing recognition that aggregate demand problems need not be short-lived. It remains to be seen whether
this recognition will lead mainstream macroeconomics to break with the Lucas
inspired research program and move away from models based on optimizing
representative households with in…nite horizons. As it is, Summers and most
other contributors to this literature seem reluctant to make that break. The
analysis therefore is left curiously atheoretical with ill-de…ned notions of ’equilibrium interest rates’ as a centerpiece of the argument. The call for measures
to increase aggregate demand is in line with functional …nance, however, and a
functional …nance perspective has implications for public debt. In this paper I
have highlighted three of them. Low economic growth, …rst, tends to produce
high debt. Reductions in government consumption, second, tend to raise the
debt in the long run. Increasing inequality, third, tends to raise the debt. The
model in this paper is exceedingly simple, but the same qualitative results can
be derived for a range of models.

Appendix A: Stability of the debt ratio
The consumption-capital ratio is given by
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and in steady growth with full employment we have
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Putting these two equations together, the required tax ratio can be written
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Plugging this tax ratio into the dynamic equation for the debt ratio, we get
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The coe¢cient on b on the right hand side of (12) is unambiguously negative
and it follows that
(1 c)(
)
n
(14)
b!b =
nc +

Appendix B: Correlation between the long-run
values of the debt ratio and the tax rate
Assume that all income is taxed at the same rate t: Then,
T
= t( + rb)
K
A stationary debt ratio requires that
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Combining this condition with equation (15), we get
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and, using (14), the long-run solution for the tax rate can be written
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Both b and t are functions of (c; ; ; ; n; ). Consider an increase in the
marginal rate of consumption out of disposable income or wealth ( an increase
in c or ). The debt ratio b will fall (use (14)), but the e¤ect on t is ambiguous.
Total di¤erentiation of (17) gives
dt
r(1 t) n
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From (17) it also follows that
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Combining (18) and (19), the reduced-form correlation between t and b following
a change in c or can be written
r(
) n
dt
=
db
( + rb)2
Thus, variations in the consumption parameters lead to a negative correlation
between the debt ratio and the tax rate if r(
) < n.
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